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We develop an economic theory of tolerance where lifestyles and traits are invested with 
symbolic value by people. Value systems are endogenous and taught by parents to their 
children. In conjunction with actual behavior, value systems determine the esteem enjoyed by 
individuals. Intolerant individuals attach all symbolic value to a small number of attributes 
and are irrespectful of people with different ones. Tolerant people have diversified values and 
respect social alterity. We study the formation of values attached to both endogenous and 
exogenous attributes, and identify circumstances under which tolerance spontaneously arises. 
Policy may affect the evolution of tolerance in distinctive ways, and there may be efficiency 
as well as equity reasons to promote tolerance. 
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Tolerance - i.e. respect for diversity - is often viewed as a distinctive feature of modern
western societies, one that clearly di⁄erentiates them from traditional ones. Whereas
"traditional man" surrenders to social norms and heavily sanctions those who deviate,
"modern man" accepts social alterity without raising his eyebrows. Tolerance is typically
welcome because it promotes peaceful coexistence between diverse groups and favors indi-
vidual self-actualization. Conversely, intolerance hinders the manifestation of proclivities
and talents and demands a heavy toll on those who dare to be di⁄erent. Minorities enjoy a
substantial degree of protection only in tolerant societies, and that protection strengthens
democratic political rights.
While tolerance might be desirable in principle, not all contemporary societies can be
quali￿ed as tolerant. Supporting this, empirical evidence comes from the World Values
Surveys - waves of representative national surveys about attitudes, starting in the 1980s
and covering plenty of countries. Those surveys show that present preindustrial societies
exhibit distinctly low levels of tolerance e.g. for abortion, divorce, and homosexuality
(Inglehart and Baker, 2000).
Cross-country di⁄erences with respect to tolerance are typically explained by soci-
ologists and political scientists resorting to so-called theories of cultural modernization.
Accordingly, along with economic prosperity and with the deepening of market relations,
deferential orientations, which subordinate the individual to the community, give way to
"democratic personalities" and "liberal attitudes" that entail growing tolerance of human
diversity (e.g. Nevitte, 1996; Inglehart, 1997).
Economists are perhaps the only social scientists who have been silent about the
nature of tolerance. However, economic reasoning can contribute original insights into the
determinants and consequences of tolerance. In the current paper, we o⁄er an economic
approach based on optimizing agents that helps to understand what tolerance is and how
it develops. The model applies a novel theory of symbolic values, that we also apply in a
companion paper (Corneo and Jeanne, 2007).
In our model, every individual is equipped with a value system. The latter maps
each element of a set of judgeable types into a scalar. The value system of an individual
determines how much esteem he allocates to himself and others. In turn, self-esteem and
the esteem received from others are arguments of an individual￿ s utility function.1
1Many economists have studied the implications of a concern for social esteem, see Fershtman and
1We study equilibria in which not only ressource allocation and relative prices but also
symbolic values are endogenously determined. A comparison with price models may illu-
minate our approach. Associated with each particular market structure, economists have
developed formal models to explain how prices form. Similarly, value formation can be
explained with reference to various socialization structures. While perfect market com-
petition is the reference mechanism for studying prices, perfect socialization by altruistic
parents can be considered as providing the benchmark model for studying symbolic val-
ues. This means that parents choose the value system of their children so as to maximize
their children￿ s expected utility.2
Such a perfect vertical socialization is an idealization. Parents actually compete with
other agencies like school, churches, and commercial advertisers, which all invest resources
in order to a⁄ect the value systems of people. Still, the key role of the family in shaping
people￿ s values has been documented in many empirical studies and focussing on this
channel delivers multiple insights about tolerance.
We propose to think of tolerance as a property of the value system endorsed by people.
A person is tolerant if she attaches symbolic value not only to her own characteristics but
also to those that she does not have - but others have. Conversely, an intolerant person has
an unbalanced value system that makes her at the same time complacent and irrespectful
of traits and lifestyles that are not her own. A theory of tolerance must identify the
circumstances under which parents have an incentive to educate their children to open
minds, i.e. transmit a value system that attaches relatively equal worth to di⁄erent traits
and lifestyles.
The judgeable attributes that enter value systems and for which tolerance can be
de￿ned are as diverse as ethnic group, gender, profession and sexual orientation. We
organize our investigation around three headings: endogenous attributes (e.g. occupa-
tion), exogenous stochastic attributes (e.g. homosexuality), and exogenous deterministic
attributes (e.g. race). While in some cases it may be debatable how to exactly classify a
particular attribute (e.g. religion), this way of proceding enables us to present the relevant
trade-o⁄s in a very clear fashion.
It turns out that the mechanisms that may lead to the spontaneous emergence of tol-
Weiss (1998a) for a review of the literature. Caring about the opinion of others may be wired into
human beings as the outcome of evolutionary selection, as argued e.g. by Fershtman and Weiss (1998b).
Also instrumental reasons may be at work, see e.g. Corneo and Jeanne (1998). For a discussion of the
methodological issues involved in modeling social concerns, see Postlewaite (1998).
2An alternative route followed by the litereature is the evolutionary approach, where the preference
pro￿le in society is determined by a process of economic selection. In such a framework, the exoge-
nously given preferences are replaced by an exogenous "￿tness" criterion which determines the number
of individuals with given preferences. See e.g. Frank (1987) and Fershtman and Weiss (1998b).
2erance vary, depending on the nature of the attribute. The case of endogenous attributes
can be seen most clearly when cast in a model of occupational choice. Along history,
di⁄erent occupations have been invested with very di⁄erent values and those values have
changed a lot. As an example, one may think of the very low value attached to commerce
in ancient Rome as compared to Venice in the Middle Ages. Even today, the aura of
the ￿nancial investor is perceived very di⁄erently in di⁄erent societies and there are some
occupations that are almost generally deprived of respect, e.g. sexual workers in some
countries.3
In the case of endogenous attributes, a value system can be seen as an incentive
mechanism designed by a benevolent parent. If the parent knows rather well in which
occupation the o⁄spring would fare at best, than the parent optimally tilts his child￿ s value
system in favor of that occupation. By teaching pride for that occupation and contempt
for the remaining ones, the parent enhances the o⁄spring￿ s self-esteem at no private cost.
If most parents in a community see the future of their children in the same occupation,
those who end up in a di⁄erent occupation su⁄er from a very low social esteem.
If instead there is uncertainty about the o⁄spring￿ s talent or the future income oppor-
tunities associated with the various occupations, a more agnostic socialization is optimal.
With uncertainty, an open mind generates an insurance e⁄ect: value diversi￿cation avoids
the risk of very low self-esteem due to the "wrong" combination of values and behavior.
We formally show that if the degree of uncertainty about pecuniary rewards to occu-
pations is large enough, in a socio-economic equilibrium individuals may even become
perfectly tolerant, i.e. attach the same symbolic value to all occupations.
The identi￿ed link between predictability and intolerance squares well with histori-
cal records. Traditional pre-industrial societies displayed both rare occupational change
(because of entry restrictions and slow technical progress) and low geographical mobility
(because of exhorbitant mobility costs). This implied a relatively high degree of pre-
dictability of future activity and location. This may explain the widely observed craft
honour and local patriotism of traditional societies. Craft honour and local patriotism
began to vanish when technological and political innovations dramatically increased pro-
fessional and geographical mobility.
The insurance motive is also key to explain tolerance about exogenous traits that
parents cannot observe when they socialize their children. In that case, we show that
the symbolic value associated to an attribute increases with the subjective probability
held by the parents about their child developing that trait. As a consequence, beliefs
3The current approach can also be applied to study tolerance with respect to illegal, especially criminal,
behavior. We leave that topic for future research.
3dynamics can be a crucial ingredient to explain changes in tolerance, e.g. with respect to
homosexuality.
We show in a simple model that societies may be trapped in an intolerant equilibrium
in which individuals with the minority trait hide their true identity and by doing this
con￿rm the belief that the trait is rare. This, in turn, leads families to instill intolerant
values which justify the mimicking behavior of those with the minority trait. In such
a situation, an anti-discrimination law that weakens the incentive to hide the trait may
induce outing, updating of beliefs about trait frequency, and, eventually, a more tolerant
value system.
The mechanism by which tolerant values arise is quite di⁄erent in the case of determin-
istic exogenous traits, like gender and nationality. We develop a model in which people
with di⁄erent traits bilaterally match in order to exploit some synergy, e.g. through mar-
riage or international trade. If matching is exogenous, parents have no private incentive to
inculcate respect for alterity. If matching is voluntary, an individual￿ s value system may
work as an asset that improves the individual￿ s competitiveness in the matching game.
Tolerance yields a competitive advantage to its carrier since the latter can be expected
to respect the partner￿ s identity and is therefore a more attractive companion. Thus, in
situations where individuals compete for partners, educating to respect for alterity can be
seen as an investment prior to matching. Liberalizing matching institutions can promote
tolerance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we brie￿ y state the main
postulates of our theory of symbolic values and compare it to related approaches. Section
3 develops the model of tolerance with respect to endogenous attributes, while Section 4
deals with exogenous attributes. Section 5 o⁄ers a concluding discussion.
2 Symbolic values and related literature
Our theory of symbolic values is based on four postulates:
Postulate 1: Evaluative Attitude
Individuals pass judgments of approval, admiration, etc., and their opposite upon cer-
tain traits, acts, and outcomes.
Each individual is equipped with a value system, i.e., a way to allocate value to bundles
of judgeable characteristics. Formally, we shall describe the value system of an individual
as a function that maps the set of judgeable types onto the real line. We take the set of
4judgeable types as exogenously given.4
We think of the evaluation of types as an essentially relative procedure by which
granting more value to a type implies that less value is attributed to the remaining ones.
A special case is one where the individual ranks all types and the symbolic value that the
individual associates with any particular type is that type￿ s rank. Since the total number
of ranks is given, assigning a higher value to a given type would imply that a lower value
is associated to other types. However, we do not want to restrict value systems to be
rank-dependent because people￿s judgements seem to entail more than rank information:
two types that rank one after the other may be close or far apart in terms of their symbolic
values and that di⁄erence should be captured by two di⁄erent value systems. Therefore,
in order to capture both the relative dimension of values and value di⁄erences that do not
stem from di⁄erences in rank, we normalize the total amount of value that an individual
associates with all types to a constant; the allocation of that amount to the various types
is then de￿ned as the individual￿ s value system.
Postulate 2: Approbativeness
Individuals desire a good opinion of oneself on the part of other people.
The relevant human environment for approbativeness may be an individual￿ s family,
friends, colleagues, neighbors, or society at large. The desired ways of thinking may be
in a scale that distinguishes contempt, indi⁄erence, interest, approval, praise, admiration,
and veneration.
Postulate 3: Self-approbativeness
Individuals have a desire for self-esteem.
This desire for a pleasing idea of oneself presupposes self-consciousness. Humans are
both actors and spectators of what they are doing. Since they are evaluative beings, they
also judge themselves.
Postulate 4: Consistency
The standards of approbation or disapprobation which the individual applies to himself
are the same as those which he applies to other people.
This postulate corresponds to the rule of judging yourself as you would judge of others.
While psychologists have identi￿ed ways of self-deception, i.e., methods that individuals
adopt to manipulate their self-image, in the main individuals are subject to the control
4A similar approach is adopted in the models of cultural evolution and identity. There, the existence
of a culturally relevant trait and that of a social category are taken as given.
5by the logic of consistency. It is di¢ cult to systematically approve in oneself acts which
one condemns in others, and when one does so, his fellows are quick to point out the
inconsistency.
The formation of symbolic values can be studied within a variety of models. As
mentioned in the Introduction, this paper focuses on socialization by altruistic parents.
This approach is closely related to models of cultural evolution proposed by Bisin and
Verdier (2000, 2001), who have studied settings in which parents purposely socialize their
children to selected cultural traits.5 In their model, vertical socialization, along with
intragenerational imitation, determines the long-term distribution of cultural traits in the
population. Under some conditions, Bisin and Verdier￿ s theory predicts convergence to a
culturally heterogeneous population.
Our theory di⁄ers from Bisin and Verdier￿ s mainly in two respects. First, Bisin and
Verdier assume that parents want their children to have the same cultural trait as them-
selves. They motivate this assumption by the possibility of "imperfect empathy" on the
side of parents. This means that parents evaluate their children￿ s actions using their (the
parents￿ ) preferences. In our theory, parents choose the value system of their children so as
to maximize the children￿ s utility. Second, the objects that are transmitted from parents
to children are modeled in di⁄erent ways. Whereas in Bisin and Verdier￿ s theory parents
transmit a preference trait, in ours they transmit a value system. The essential property
of a value system is that, taking it in conjunction with a course of action, it determines the
esteem enjoyed by the individual. In our theory, individuals have preferences over esteem
and the usual list of consumption goods. The advantage of modeling socialization to a
value system rather than to a preference trait is that one keeps preferences ￿xed, so that
normative analysis based on the Pareto criterion is possible. The cost of this modeling
approach is that one has to add esteem to the standard arguments of the utility function.
This is also true of Bisin and Verdier￿ s theory, which introduces the o⁄spring￿ s preference
parameter in the parent￿ s utility function.
A related approach has been developed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005), whose
notion of identity shares some important features with our notion of self-esteem. In their
theory, a person￿ s identity is associated with di⁄erent social categories and how people
in these categories should behave. Violating behavioral prescriptions causes a utility loss
and may produce responses by others who want to defend their sense of self. We follow
Akerlof and Kranton￿ s theory in that we also generalize the utility function so as to include
arguments that capture important nonpecuniary motivations of human action. However,
5Empirical evidence on cultural transmission from parents to children has been presented e.g. by
Fernandez et al. (2004), who argue that mothers a⁄ect their sons￿preferences over women.
6we employ a di⁄erent method to determine the prevailing norms of behavior. Akerlof and
Kranton use sociological evidence to formulate assumptions about behavioral prescriptions
that are likely to capture important aspects of reality. We derive those prescriptions as
part of an equilibrium in a model based on individual optimization under constraints.
Concerns for self-respect and esteem also play a key role in Benabou and Tirole￿ s (2006)
model of pro-social behavior. However, their main interest is the interaction between
those nonpecuniary motivations and asymmetric information. That interaction gives rise
to both social signaling and self-signaling ￿when people are uncertain about the kind
of people they are. Assuming that people value public spiritedness and disvalue greed,
Benabou and Tirole generate several new insights concerning individuals￿contributions
to public goods. By contrast with the current paper, they do not deal with the issue of
why people attach value to certain attributes and not to others.
3 Respect for others￿activities
Occupation is a central category for de￿ning one￿ s identity and a natural object of evalu-
ation. For most people, work is a de￿ning element of the self, not simply because a large
fraction of one￿ s lifetime is absorbed by work but also because it is mainly through work
that the person consciously shapes her environment, i.e. expresses her individuality.
In the current Section we study the allocation of value to occupations in a simple
model of occupational choice. There are two distinctive activities e.g. craftsman vs.
merchant, civilian vs. military profession, manual vs. intellectual worker, employee vs.
self-employed, job in the non-pro￿t sector vs. job in the for-pro￿t sector. Parents instill
values about those activities into their children. When an individual reaches adult age,
his values in￿ uence his occupational choice and determine how respectful he is of other
individuals, depending on their occupation.
We begin with a deterministic version of the model where tolerance does not arise.
Then, we extend the model to incorporate uncertainty and identify circumstances under
which tolerance arises.
3.1 Deterministic benchmark
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of atomistic individuals i 2 [0;1]: In-
dividuals consume one homogeneous good, which is used as the numeraire. They have
common preferences and specialize in one of two activities or occupations, referred to as a
and b. The income accruing to an individual specializing in activity x 2 fa;bg is denoted
7by yx.6 In order to capture decreasing returns and congestion e⁄ects, we assume that the
income obtained from an activity is a decreasing function of the number of individuals
who practice that activity. Denoting by n the number of individuals who practice activity
a, the incomes ya(n) and yb(n) are respectively decreasing and increasing with n, and
both functions are continuous.7
Occupations are invested with symbolic value by individuals. The value attached to
occupation x 2 fa;bg by individual i is measured by a non-negative index v(x;i). The
couple fv(a;i);v(b;i)g describes the value system of individual i. We use the normalization
v(a;i) + v(b;i) = 1; (1)
so that the value of an activity relative to the alternative is between -1 and +1.
Individuals care about consumption and esteem, both of which depend on occupational
choice. We consider an additively separable speci￿cation of preferences,
U(i) = S(c(i)) + ￿V (selfv(i)) + ￿W(socv(i)): (2)
The functions S(￿); V (￿) and W(￿) are strictly increasing and continuous. The ￿rst one
captures utility from consumption, which is given by the individual￿ s income: c(i) = yx(i),
where x(i) 2 fa;bg denotes the individual￿ s occupation.
The second one captures utility from self-esteem. We de￿ne an individual￿ s self-esteem
as the esteem in which he holds his own occupation:
selfv(i) = v(x(i);i): (3)
The third term of the utility function captures utility from esteem received from others.
In the model of the current Section we only consider the esteem received from society at
large, i.e. an individual￿ s social esteem. This is de￿ned as the average of the esteem





Parameters ￿ and ￿ are positive and capture the strength of value concerns.
The timing of decisions is as follows. First, each individual i chooses his value system
fv(a;i);v(b;i)g subject to constraint (1). This step of the game can be interpreted as
6Income should be thought of as including not only pay but all material consequences of an occupation
that are relevant for utility.
7An example that satis￿es our assumptions is the following. The consumption good is produced by
competitive ￿rms with two types of labor, a and b, and the production function is increasing and strictly
concave in the two types of labor. With competitive labor markets, the equilibrium wages of the two
occupations are continuous and decreasing functions of the number of individuals in each occupation.
8a benevolent parent choosing the values of his child. Second, individuals choose their
activities x(i) conditional on their values. Then, individuals receive their income and
consume.
We are going to characterize a socio-economic equilibrium, i.e. a situation in which
each agent chooses his activity and values so as to maximize his utility function, taking
the choices of other agents as given. A basic property of that equilibrium is the following:
Proposition 1 In equilibirium, each individual attaches the maximal amount of value to
the activity that he practices:
v(x(i);i) = 1; 8i:
Proof: It is optimal for an agent who knows which activity he will perform to invest
all symbolic value on this activity, since this increases his self-esteem without a⁄ecting
the other determinants of his utility. QED
Hence, individuals are completely irrespectful of alterity: v(x;i) = 0 if x 6= x(i).
The proof of Proposition 1 relies entirely on the fact that individuals know their future
occupations when they choose their values. Given the absence of uncertainty about the
returns to occupations a and b, individuals know their future occupation in equilibrium.
Individuals cannot expect to be indi⁄erent between the two occupations when they choose
their values: if it were the case, they would strictly increase their utility by changing their
values in a way that tips the balance towards one of the two occupations.
To prepare for the analysis of the stochastic version of the model, it is useful to stress
some other properties of the equilibrium. By Proposition 1, the net bene￿t of occupation
a relative to occupation b is
Ba(n) = [S(ya(n)) ￿ S(yb(n))] + ￿ [W (n) ￿ W (1 ￿ n)]: (5)
The ￿rst term in square brackets on the right-hand side of this equation captures the
material gain from choosing occupation a rather than b. This term is decreasing with
n because of the impact of the relative scarsity of the two types of labor upon their
relative income. The second term in square brackets captures the symbolic gain from
choosing occupation a rather than b. This term is increasing with n because the social
esteem granted to an occupation increases with the number of individuals who value
that occupation which is, in equilibrium, the number of individuals who choose that
occupation.
An interior equilibrium, in which both occupations are chosen by a strictly positive
mass of individuals, must satisfy the equilibrium condition Ba = 0: One can also have
9corner equilibria in which all individuals choose occupation a (n = 1 and Ba ￿ 0) or b
(n = 0 and Ba ￿ 0). If Ba is strictly decreasing with n on the whole [0;1] interval, then
the equilibrium must be unique.
The second term on the right-hand side in (5) increases with n from ￿￿[W(1)￿W(0)]
for n = 0 to ￿[W(1)￿W(0)] for n = 1. If ￿ is large enough this term dominates, implying
that there are two stable equilibria, one in which all individuals practice a and one in
which they all practice b. Conversely, if ￿ is small enough, the equilibrium is unique.
Therefore, concerns for social esteem can lead to conformism. By choosing to invest
symbolic value in his own future activity an individual reduces the social esteem for the
other activity and thus induces other individuals to imitate him. This may generate
bandwagon e⁄ects in the choice of values and activities.
In an interior equilibrium, the concern for social esteem magni￿es the di⁄erence be-
tween the size of group a and that of group b. Suppose that there exists e n 2 (0;1) such
that ya(e n) = yb(e n) and suppose e n 6= 1=2. The condition Ba = 0 can be sati￿ed at n = e n
if and only if ￿ = 0. Consider a stable interior equilibrium, satisfying B0
a(n) < 0 (this
requires ￿ to be not too large). If e n < 1=2, then Ba(e n) < 0 and Ba is equal to zero for a
value of n lower than e n. If e n > 1=2, then Ba(e n) > 0 and Ba is equal to zero for a value of
n higher than e n. Hence, the concern for social esteem reduces the size of group a if it is
smaller than 1/2 and increases it if it is larger. The reason is that individuals who belong
to majority groups tend enjoy more social esteem in an intolerant society.
Notice that this conformism e⁄ect could not arise in a perfectly tolerant society. If
all individuals attach the same value to each occupation, the symbolic rewards of both
occupations are equal, independently from the size of their relative workforces, and only
income matters for the individual￿ s choice.
3.2 Socialization under uncertainty
A natural interpretation of the above model is that an individual￿ s values are selected by
his benevolent parents and the latter have perfect foresight about the occupation of their
child. We now relax the assumption of perfect foresight by allowing the income level to be
stochastic. Speci￿cally, individual i is assumed to earn ya(n)(1+￿i) if employed in sector
a, and to earn yb(n)(1 ￿ ￿i) if employed in sector b, where ￿i is a binomial zero-mean
random variable equal to ￿ 2 [0;1] with probability 1/2 and to ￿￿ with probability 1/2.
Thus, ￿ measures the degree of uncertainty and captures the parents￿lack of knowledge
about the relative payo⁄s of occupations faced by their children when adults.8 We refer
to the realization of ￿i as to the income opportunities or the talent of individual i. For
8The deterministic model corresponds to the special case where ￿ = 0.
10ease of exposition, we assume completely independent risks. Thus, ex post there is one
half of the population that is talented for a and the other half is talented for b; there is
no aggregate risk.9
We additionally assume that S(￿) and V (￿) are strictly concave, and that a positive
consumption level is necessary for subsistence, i.e. limc!0 S(c) = ￿1:
The sequence of events is as follows. First, the parent of individual i 2 [0;1] chooses his
child￿ s value system fv(a;i);v(b;i)g subject to (1). The parent is perfectly benevolent and
selects the values that maximize his child￿ s expected utility. Second, Nature selects the
income opportunities and each individual gets to know them. Third, individuals choose
their occupations x(i), receive their income, and consume.
3.2.1 Decision problem at family level
We solve for the parent￿ s optimal investment in values by proceeding backwards, looking
￿rst at the child￿ s choice of occupation, conditional on his values. Notice that when the
child makes his choice, uncertainty has already been resolved so that the child has perfect
foresight.
Utility derived from social esteem attached to each activity is exogenous at the indi-
vidual level; thus, it will simply be denoted by Wa for activity a and by Wb for activity
b. Similarly, we use ya and yb for the pecuniary return to activities. Individual (child) i
selects activity a if and only if
S(ya(1 + ￿i)) + ￿V (va) + ￿Wa > S(yb(1 ￿ ￿i)) + ￿V (1 ￿ va) + ￿Wb;
where we use vx for v(x;i), x 2 fa;bg, to save notation.
There are three cases to consider. The individual chooses activity a irrespective of
his income opportunities, he chooses activity b irrespective of his income opportunities,
or he chooses activity a if and only if ￿i = ￿. These cases respectively arise under the
following conditions:
V (va) ￿ V (1 ￿ va) >
1
￿
[S(yb(1 + ￿)) ￿ S(ya(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ ￿(Wa ￿ Wb)];
V (va) ￿ V (1 ￿ va) <
1
￿
[S(yb(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ S(ya(1 + ￿)) ￿ ￿(Wa ￿ Wb)];
1
￿
[S(yb(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ S(ya(1 + ￿)) ￿ ￿(Wa ￿ Wb)] < V (va) ￿ V (1 ￿ va) ^
V (va) ￿ V (1 ￿ va) <
1
￿
[S(yb(1 + ￿)) ￿ S(ya(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ ￿(Wa ￿ Wb)]:
9As shown by Corneo and Jeanne (2007), the case of aggregate risk leads to qualitatively similar
results.
11Since V (va) ￿ V (1 ￿ va) is strictly increasing in va, these conditions de￿ne three sub-
intervals for the value of activity a, say [0;va[; [va;va]; and ]va;1], such that the individual
chooses activity a (b) irrespective of his income opportunities if and only if the value he
puts on activity a is in the third (￿rst) interval, and he chooses the activity for which the
income shock is positive if and only if va is in the intermediate interval. This is intuitive:
the individual chooses the activity with the highest pecuniary payo⁄ when his choice is
not too much in￿ uenced, in one way or another, by symbolic values.
Note that, depending on preferences and returns to occupations, one could have va = 0
or va = 1, in which case the ￿rst or the third interval have zero measure. The intermediate
interval collapses to one point va = va if there is no uncertainty about the child￿ s talent,
i.e. ￿ = 0.
Let us turn to the parents￿decision problem. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty,
parents have perfect foresight about the aggregate variables. However, they are uncertain
about their child￿ s income opportunities. In the three sub-intervals de￿ned above, the
level of their child￿ s expected utility is given as follows:
in [0;va[, E[U] =
S(yb(1 ￿ ￿)) + S(yb(1 + ￿))
2
+ ￿V (1 ￿ va) + ￿Wb;
in [va;va], E[U] =
1
2
[S(ya(1 + ￿)) + ￿V (va) + ￿Wa] +
1
2
[S(yb(1 + ￿)) + ￿V (1 ￿ va) + ￿Wb];
in ]va;1], E[U] =
S(ya(1 ￿ ￿)) + S(ya(1 + ￿))
2
+ ￿V (va) + ￿Wa:
Figure 1 shows how E[U] depends on va in the case where the three intervals have a
strictly positive measure. The child￿ s welfare is strictly decreasing with va in the left-
hand-side interval: increasing the value put by the child on activity a unambiguously
reduces his welfare since he will practice activity b with certainty. The child￿ s welfare
strictly increases with va in the right-hand-side interval. The child￿ s welfare is a concave


















00(1 ￿ va)] < 0:
From the expression above, it follows that if the interval [va;va] contains 1=2, then in
this interval the child￿ s welfare is maximized by va = 1=2. If the interval [va;va] does
not contain 1=2, then E[U] will reach its local maximum at a bound of the interval: 1=2
should be replaced by va if va > 1=2 and by va if va < 1=2.
12Letting vm denote the optimal value of activity a in the interval [va;va], the corre-
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In the left-hand-side and right-hand-side intervals, the child￿ s expected utility is max-
imized by setting va to respectively 0 and 1, since in the left-hand-side interval expected
utility strictly decreases with va and in the right-hand-side expected utility strictly in-
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Proposition 2 There exists a critical threshold in the uncertainty over the child￿ s income
opportunities, ￿ > 0, such that:
if ￿ < ￿, the parent invests all the symbolic value in one activity which his child will
practice irrespective of his income opportunities;
if ￿ > ￿, the parent invests the same symbolic value in each activity and the child
chooses the one for which the income shock is positive.
13Proof: We ￿rst show that there exists a unique ￿ > 0 such that the parent is










It is easy to see that E[U]￿
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By contrast, U￿
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sp is strictly increasing with ￿, negative for ￿ = 0 and converges to
plus in￿nity if ￿ = 1 because S(0) = ￿1. Since U￿
sp and E[U]￿
m are continuous in ￿,
there exists a unique ￿ between 0 and 1 such that E[U]￿
m = U￿
sp.
It remains to be shown that whenever diversi￿cation is optimal, then both activities
are invested with the same symbolic value. This can be proven by contradiction. Suppose
that the optimal value choice belongs to the interval [va;va] but is not 1/2. Since it is given
by vm, the optimal value must therefore be either the lower or the upper bound of that
interval. First, suppose vm = va. Since E[U] is strictly decreasing in the interval [0;va[,
there exists a va in this interval that yields a higher expected utility than va. Hence, va
cannot be optimal. Second, suppose vm = va. Since E[U] is strictly increasing in ]va;1],
there exists va in this interval that yields a higher expected utility than va. Hence, va
cannot be optimal either. This shows that if vm is optimal, then vm = 1=2. QED
If the amount of uncertainty is negligible, parents optimally invest all symbolic value
in one activity because doing so maximizes the child￿ s self-esteem and costs little in terms
of expected consumption. Parents adopt in this case a kind of authoritarian paternalism
towards their children, i.e. inculcate such value systems that the children are forced by
their own values to embrace the occupation that their parents actually chose for them.
The result is a society formed by highly complacent and intolerant people.
If the child￿ s income opportunities are quite uncertain, a paternalistic strategy may
not be individually rational. In order to preserve a high level of self-esteem, the child
might perform an activity for which he is not talented. Beyond some point, uncertainty
14becomes so large that the income risk is not worthwhile bearing and the parents wish
their child to perform the activity for which he turns out to be more talented. In this
case, an agnostic view of the worth of occupations is transmitted. The result for society
is more balanced and tolerant people.
Therefore, from a private point of view, authoritarian paternalism may be discarded
because it makes the individual carry a too large risk. Conversely, an open mind works
as an insurance device with respect to one￿ s self esteem and encourages individuals to
exploit economic opportunities.
3.2.2 General equilibrium
At the general-equilibrium level, both the returns of the activities and their social esteem
are endogenous. These variables determine the threshold level ￿ which is crucial for the
choice of values by the parents.
Proposition 3 An equilibrium in which all individuals are perfectly tolerant exists if and
only if the uncertainty over the child￿ s income opportunities is large enough. The threshold
level of uncertainty is strictly increasing in ￿, the concern for self-esteem, and is una⁄ected
by ￿, the concern for social esteem.
Proof: By Proposition 2, in an equilibrium without intolerant individuals, v(a;i) =
1=2, 8i and n = 1=2 since one half of the population is talented for one or the other
occupation ex post. As a consequence, ya = ya(1=2), yb = yb(1=2), Wa = Wb = W(1=2).
By Proposition 2, tolerance is the optimal strategy for parents if and only if ￿ > ￿,
where ￿ is implicitly de￿ned by (6).
Hence, a general equilibrium without intolerant individuals exists if and only if ￿
is larger than the threshold level implicitly de￿ned by (6) where the functions U￿
sp and
E[U]￿
m are evaluated at ya = ya(1=2), yb = yb(1=2), Wa = Wb = W(1=2).
Let ￿
￿
denote the general equilibrium threshold level. Proof of existence and unique-
ness of this threshold level is equivalent to that given for Proposition 2. Straightforward
computations reveal that the threshold level of uncertainty ￿
￿



















































































15Totally di⁄erentiating this expression reveals that the threshold level is strictly increasing
in ￿, the concern for self-esteem, and is una⁄ected by ￿, the concern for social esteem.
QED
In the general equilibrium, there are three strategies that parents may follow: author-
itarian education investing all value on a, authoritarian education investing all value on
b, and permissive education with value diversi￿cation. The general equilibrium can be
monomorphic, with all parents choosing the same strategy, or polymorphic, with di⁄erent
strategies yielding the same expected utility in equilibrium.
Besides the monomorphic equilibrium described in Proposition 3, tolerance may arise
with respect to a subset of the entire population as a part of a polymorphic equilibrium.
In such a case, tolerant individuals choose the activity with the highest income and enjoy
a less than maximal level of self-esteem. The remaining individuals attain a maximal
level of self-esteem, but face the risk of choosing the activity with the lowest income.
While ex ante the expected utilities of tolerant and intolerant individuals are equal, ex
post they di⁄er. The conditions for existence of this type of equilibrium are derived in
the Appendix. It remains true that the general equilibrium displays tolerant individuals
if and only if the uncertainty parameter ￿ is large enough.
3.3 E¢ ciency aspects of tolerance
While the socialization strategies selected by parents are privately optimal, they need
not be socially optimal: a socialization failure may occur. For instance, it could be that
the socio-economic equilibrium only has intolerant individuals while tolerance is socially
desirable. We now explore the possibility of e¢ ciency reasons for collective action in
support of tolerant values.
In order to illustrate how e¢ ciency concerns may justify policies for tolerance, consider
the deterministic model. If all individuals are intolerant, the two activities will carry a
di⁄erent social esteem as soon as n 6= 1=2. In contrast, if all individuals are perfectly
tolerant (i.e., attach the same value to each activity), the two activities will carry the
same esteem. Hence, a distinctive consequence of intolerance is to induce a wedge, in
equilibrium, between the real return of the two activities. The move from an intolerant
to a tolerant society would therefore increase aggregate income. Intuitively, in a tolerant
society there is no social pressure to choose any particular activity and people choose the
one with the largest material return. Thereby, production e¢ ciency is enhanced.
As noted above, there is a utility loss inherent in the shift to tolerance, that comes
from the reduction in self-esteem. However, if ￿[V (1) ￿ V (1=2)] is su¢ ciently small, this
16loss is more than o⁄set by the income gain. The Appendix o⁄ers an example where a
shift from laissez-faire to a tolerant society generates a Pareto-improvement.
4 Respecting others￿traits
In contemporary societies, intolerance mainly concerns groups that di⁄er by some char-
acteristic that they are not really responsible for, like sexual orientation, colour of skin,
religion, and ethnic group. Di⁄erently from occupation, those traits cannot freely be cho-
sen by individuals. The same could be argued with respect to traits like alcoholism and
drugs use, the occurrence of which might have genetic causes.
In this Section, we analyze tolerance with respect to carriers of exogenous character-
istics in two simple models. First, we show that the presence of uncertainty can generate
a limited amount of tolerance and discuss equity reasons for public policy in support of
tolerance in that case. Second, we describe a setting where a heterogeneously tolerant
society can emerge in cases where there is no uncertainty about the judgeable trait.
4.1 Uncertain traits
We now assume that symbolic value is attached to a trait x 2 fa;bg that is exogenously
acquired with a given probability. As an example, individuals with trait a could be the
heterosexual ones and those with trait b the homosexual ones. Parents inculcate values
about x in their children before knowing which trait they will have.
4.1.1 Symmetric information
As in Section 3.1, there is a continuum of individuals i 2 [0;1] who derive utility from
consumption and esteem. Preferences and value systems satisfy equations (1), (2), (3)
and (4). We assume that V 00 < 0. The trait is exogenous and pecuniarily neutral, i.e.
ya(n) = yb(n) = y for all n. We denote by q 2 (0;1=2) the probability for a child to
develop trait b, the minority trait.
Benevolent parents choose their child￿ s value system before knowing the child￿ s trait.
The realization of the trait in conjunction with the value systems determine the esteem
of individuals. In equilibrium, every parent maximizes his child￿ s expected utility taking
other parents￿decisions as given.





17and (1). The value attached to b is strictly increasing with q.
Proof: At the individual level an individual￿ s social esteem is given; thus, the value
system is chosen so as to maximize the expected utility from self-esteem. By (1), (2)
and (3), in an interior equilibrium, the socialization strategy will satisfy the ￿rst-order
condition given in the Proposition. The symbolic value of trait b is then implicitly given
by






Di⁄erentiating this equation and using V 00 < 0 shows that vb strictly increases with q.
QED
If q is close to 0, people will attach a very low value to b; for instance, if V (￿) is
logarithmic, than vb = q. Then, those who end up with trait b will su⁄er from both a
very low level of self-esteem and a very low level of social esteem.
This laissez-faire outcome may be publicly viewed as unjust because the individuals
are not responsible for their trait. Conversely, tolerance would equalize the level of esteem
over individuals and this outcome may be seen as equitable. Speci￿cally, tolerance would
be implemented by a Rawlsian social planner whose task is to select a common value
system so as to maximin the ex-post level of utility in society.
Notice, however, that tolerance would not be warranted on equity reasons if one adopts
a utilitarian welfare function. In that case, the ￿rst-order condition for the maximization




















Since q < 1=2, this condition cannot be satis￿ed by va = 1=2. This condition is also
di⁄erent from the equilibrium ￿rst-order condition under laissez-faire because of the terms
in W 0. However, it is a priori unclear whether the values preferred by the utilitarian
planner are more or less tolerant than those arising under laissez-faire. If W 0 is constant,
the planner prefers less tolerant values.
4.1.2 Asymmetric information and learning
We now illustrate how anti-discrimination laws may induce private information to be
released and thereby increase the degree of tolerance with respect to exogenous stochastic
traits.
Modify the model above so as to introduce asymmetric information and learning along
the following lines. First, assume that generations t = 1;2;::T sequentially choose their
18values. Second, assume that there are two possible states of the world: s and s. Those
states are associated with di⁄erent frequencies of the trait b in the population: for every
generation, Prfx(i) = bjsg = q and Prfx(i) = bjsg = q, with q < q < 1=2. Third, assume
that the trait b is private information and its carriers can mimick those with trait a at a
utility cost  . This cost may be interpreted as the psychologic cost of repressing identity,
net of any costs due to discrimination. Without signi￿cant loss of generality, assume that
V (￿) is logarithmic.
All individuals ex ante choose their values and type-b individuals ex-post simultane-
ously choose whether to mimick type-a individuals. Each generation observes the fre-
quency of revealed trait b in the previous generation before choosing their values and uses
that observation to update its beliefs about the state of the world. To focus on essentials,
suppose that each generation has the prior Prfs = sg = 1.
We analyze the model starting with the socialization and mimicking decisions of the
initial generation. As in the static model, the optimal socialization strategy for individuals
at t = 1 is to set vb = q. Individuals who turn out to have trait b choose to hide their
trait, given that everybody else does the same, if
W((1 ￿ q)
2 + q




where the left-hand side is proportional to the utility gain derived from improved social
esteem and the social esteem of an imitator is his expected value, qvb + (1 ￿ q)va.
Suppose that (8) is satis￿ed, so that there exists a pooling equilibrium, i.e. outing
does not occur. Then, an equilibrium where b-type individuals reveal themselves cannot
exist. In a separating equilibrium, the condition W(1￿q)￿W(q) <  =￿ must hold, since
deviating would entail receiving a social esteem equal to va. Since q < 1=2, that condition
cannot hold if (8) is satis￿ed.
If nobody in the initial generation reveals trait b, the second generation does not learn
anything about the true state of the world. Hence, it replicates the decisions of the initial
generation. By iteration, this remains true of all generations.
This equilibrium path may be interpreted as depicting an intolerant society where
alterity does not manifest itself. In each period, individuals with the minority trait hide
their true identity and by doing this they con￿rm the prior that the trait is rare. This,
in turn, leads families to instill intolerant values which prompts those with the minority
trait to hide it.
Now, suppose that at some time t a shock shifts the utility cost of mimicking from  
to  
0 >  , for instance as a consequence of passing an anti-discrimination law. Suppose
19that





Then, the previous mimicking equilibrium breaks down and the new one has type-b indi-
viduals outing themselves.
In this case, generation t+1 learns the true state of the world. If the true state of the
world is not s, as believed by all previous generations, but s, the individuals realize that
the probability to get endowed with trait b is q > q. As a consequence, they invest trait
b with value q. At t + 1, individuals with trait b reveal themselvs if





By (9) and q > q, this condition is indeed satis￿ed and no pooling equilibrium exists.
Hence, the value attached to trait b increases to q for ever. By setting an incentive to
reveal their minority trait, an anti-discrimination law can trigger a decentralized move
towards a more tolerant value system.
4.2 Tolerance without uncertainty
Hitherto we have argued that individuals may come to invest value on characteristics
that they do not possess because their characteristics are not known by the time at which
their value system is formed. However, there are characteristics like gender, nationality,
and ethnic group that are known by parents when they socialize their children. While
the above model would predict intolerance in that case, one observes in reality that some
people do pay respect also to the gender, nationalities, and ethnic groups that are not
their own.
Tolerance with respect to known hereditary traits can be explained within a model
of perfect vertical socialization. Parents may choose tolerant values because they help to
increase their child￿ s consumption when the latter is determined through matching with
other people.
This mechanism can be explained with reference to various situations: marriage (in
which case value is invested on gender), employment when the race of the employer and
that of the employee di⁄er (value put on race), international trade ventures (value put on
nationality). In those situations, an individual￿ s payo⁄from a match often increases with
the amount of esteem received by the individual￿ s partner, i.e., the value that the partner
attaches to the individual￿ s trait.
If people compete for matches, being tolerant increases one￿ s attractiveness as a future
partner, because a tolerant partner is respectful. Thus, educating to tolerance can improve
the child￿ chances to make a good match at adult age.
204.3 A simple matching model
The following model is described in terms of a marriage market and gender is the char-
acteristic on which symbolic value is put.
There are two types of individuals, men, denoted by M, and women, denoted by F,
that are to be bilaterally matched. Each group consists of a continuum, whose mass is
normalized to one. Each individual is characterized by an initial endowment of a gender-
speci￿c good. We denote by !M and !F the endowment of, respectively, men and women.
For simplicity, the distribution of endowment is assumed to be the same for both sexes.
We suppose that the common density function is strictly positive on some interval [0;!],
with ! > 0. After that couples are formed, every man consumes his woman￿ s endowment
and every woman consumes her man￿ s endowment.
Symbolic value is associated with types. The value that individual i assigns to type
￿ 2 fM;Fg is measured by a non-negative index v(￿;i) and total symbolic value is
normalized to unity:
v(M;i) + v(F;i) = 1: (10)
Utility is an increasing function of own consumption, self-esteem and esteem granted
by one￿ s partner.10 Self-esteem is the esteem in which the individual holds his own type,
while the esteem that the individuals receives from the partner is the value put by the
latter on the individual￿ s type. We specialize the utility function to,
U = ln(v) + (1 + !p)vp; (11)
where v is the value that the individual puts on own type, !p is the endowment of the
individual￿ s partner, and vp is the value that the partner puts on the individual￿ s type.
Thus, the ￿rst term of the utility function comes from self-esteem, while the second term
comes from matching.
The timing of decisions is as follows. First, individuals simultaneously choose their
value systems fv(M;i);v(F;i)g subject to constraint (10). This step of the game can be
interpreted as benevolent parents choosing the values of their children. Second, individuals
voluntarily match. In equilibrium, values are optimally chosen, the matching outcome is
stable and correctly anticipated when the values are chosen.
We establish the following fact:
Proposition 5 (i) If matching is exogenous, tolerance does not arise: each individual
invests all symbolic value in his own type.
10Social esteem could be added without any change in results.
21(ii) If matching is endogenous, there exists an equilibrium in which tolerance arises.
In this equilibrium, the value that an individual invests in the other type is !
1+!, where !
is the individual￿ s endowment.
Proof: Part (i) immediately follows from the fact that utility strictly increases with
self-esteem.
In order to prove part (ii), we ￿rst consider the matching stage. Each individual can
be characterized by a type ￿ 2 fM;Fg and a matching value,
￿ ￿ (1 + !)(1 ￿ v): (12)
The latter is the utility that the individual contributes to the partner. It is easy to verify
that any stable matching must be assortative, i.e., men with higher matching value form
couples with women with higher matching value.
Now, consider the ￿rst stage. Instead of choosing a value system, individuals can
equivalently be seen as choosing their matching value, the relation between the two vari-
ables being given by (12). In a symmetric equilibrium, men and women with the same
endowment choose the same matching value. So, let H denote the common distribution
of matching value of men and women in equilibrium.
Because matching is positively assortative, a man who chooses ￿ will be matched with
a woman whose rank in the distribution of female matching values is H(￿), i.e., the same
as the man￿ s rank in the distribution of male matching values. Then, that man￿ s utility
derived from matching will be H￿1(H(￿)) = ￿, i.e., the matching value chosen by that
man.
Hence, making use of (11) and (12), an individual￿ s choice of values is optimal if it
maximizes
U = ln(v) + (1 + !)(1 ￿ v):





which establishes the second part of the Proposition. QED
Tolerance can only arise if there is competition for partners. When matching is ex-
ogenous, there is no incentive to teach respect for the partner￿ s trait and tolerance does
not emerge. Under voluntary matching, there is an equilibrium in which parents teach
22respect for alterity in order to secure their child a match of better quality. Eliminating
restrictions on the choice of partners may therefore promote tolerance.11
5 Conclusion
Maintaining and promoting tolerant attitudes towards social alterity is increasingly recog-
nized as an important contribution to make the world a safer place. In this paper we have
proposed an economic theory of tolerance and the conditions under which it spontaneously
arises. Individuals have been de￿ned as tolerant if they endorse a diversi￿ed value system;
a theoretical framework has been developed where those value systems are endogenously
determined. Speci￿cally, we have explored the implications of a socialization structure in
which altruistic parents control the values of their children. We have investigated how
value formation interacts with economic behavior and shown that tolerance may some-
times be predicated on equity or e¢ ciency grounds.
A key insight from our analysis is that parents may face various types of trade-o⁄s when
deciding whether to transmit a tolerant attitude, depending on the nature of the attribute
that is object of value. Some attributes, like economic activity and sexual orientation,
cannot be observed at the time when the value system is formed. In those cases, the
advantage of having an open mind increases with the amount of parents￿uncertainty
because an open mind avoids the risk of ending up with the "wrong" combination of
attributes and values. Attributes like gender and nationality are, however, already known
at the time of socialization. In those cases, tolerant values can spontaneously arise under
competition for partners. Under voluntary matching, tolerance may yield a competitive
advantage to its carrier, since the latter can be expected to respect the partner￿ s alterity.
Policy may a⁄ect the incentives for parents to transmit tolerant values. Depending on
the context, reducing mobility costs, introducing anti-discrimination laws, and liberalizing
matching institutions may induce parents to socialize their children to tolerant values.
The analysis in this paper has been carried out in a very simpli￿ed framework where
benevolent parents are entirely responsible for their children￿ s values. Future research
could introduce other channels of cultural transmission into the type of models developed
in this paper and examine their consequences for the emergence of tolerance. In this
respect, the two following extensions seem particularly promising. First, self-interest on
the part of parents may distinctly shape the values that they try to instill in their children.
11Complete intolerance remains an equilibrium outcome also under voluntary matching. If nobody of
the opposite sex is expected to be respectful, there is no point in competing for partners because they
all yield the same matching value. Then, no value is put on alterity. However, the tolerant equilibrium
Pareto-dominates the intolerant one. In contrast to the intolerant equilibrium, the tolerant one is Pareto
e¢ cient.
23Parents may be concerned about the esteem that they receive from their children as holders
of a particular attribute. Then, parents may transmit a value for their own attribute, even
if by doing so they encourage behavior that is detrimental to their children￿ s welfare. This
modeling might provide insights into the incentives for members of religious minorities to
teach a high value for observance of their own religion.
Second, one could model the in￿ uence of interest groups, like unions and employers￿
associations, on horizontal socialization in order to study the interaction between tolerance
towards immigrants, migration, and inter-ethnic marriages. An individual￿ s value system
could be assumed to be randomly determined acccording to a probability distribution.
The probabilities associated with the various value systems could be a function of both
the values taught by parents and the values propagated by interest groups. While parents
may be motivated by matching considerations along the lines of the model presented in
this paper, interest groups may be concerned about the e⁄ects of value systems on the
in￿ ow of migrants and, as a consequence, on wages and pro￿ts.
24Appendix 1: Polymorphic Equilibrium
At most three types of socialization strategies may exist in equilibrium: investing
all symbolic value in a, investing all symbolic value in b, or putting the same value in
each activity. De￿ne, respectively, by ￿, ￿ and ￿ the mass of families following each
socialization strategy in equilibrium, with ￿ + ￿ + ￿ = 1.
By the law of large numbers, one half of the number of children of permissive parents
will perform activity a, while the other half will choose activity b. Thus, n = ￿+￿=2 and
1￿n = ￿+￿=2. Using these relationships and the derivations in Section 4, the expected














































































































An equilibrium vector (￿￿;￿
￿;￿￿) is an element of Simplex {3} such that if ￿￿ > 0,
then R(￿￿;￿￿) ￿ SupfL(￿
￿;￿￿);M(￿￿;￿
￿;￿￿)g and satisfying analogous conditions for
the cases ￿
￿ > 0 and ￿￿ > 0.
In principle, seven types of equilibria may exist: three monomorphic equilibria in
which only one socialization strategy is employed, three polymorphic equilibria in which
only one socialization strategy fails to be employed, and one polymorphic equilibrium in
which all three socialization strategies are employed by a strictly positive mass of families.
However, an equilibrium with three groups cannot exist. If it existed, all three social-
ization strategies would deliver the same level of expected utility. Meeting the equilibrium
conditions E[U]￿
r = E[U]￿
l is equivalent to
1
2










[S (yb (n)(1 + ￿)) ￿ S (ya (n)(1 ￿ ￿))] ￿
￿
2
[W (n) ￿ W (1 ￿ n)]
= ￿[V (1) ￿ V (1=2)]:
25Since this two-equations-system only has one unknown, it is overdetermined and generi-
cally has no solution. Hence, an equilibrium with three groups does not exist in general.
Consider now the possibility of an equilibrium where ￿￿ > 0, ￿
￿ > 0, and ￿￿ = 0.
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￿)(1 + ￿)) + S (yb (￿
￿)(1 ￿ ￿))] + ￿W (1 ￿ ￿
￿):
This equation is similar to the condition Ba = 0 in the deterministic model. This is not
surprising, since the equilibrium con￿guration that we are now considering is one in which
each family puts all symbolic value in one occupation. This is precisely what occurred
in the model studied in Sect. 3. Therefore, the same results apply here. In particular,
the case of a corner solution in the model of that Section corresponds here to the case
of non-existence of the equilibrium with both ￿￿ > 0 and ￿
￿ > 0. In that case, all the
individuals practice the same occupation in equilibrium.
Consider now the more interesting case where ￿￿ > 0, ￿￿ > 0, and ￿
￿ = 0. Such a
con￿guration could not arise in the model without uncertainty. In an equilibrium with
both tolerant people and intolerant people practicing activity a, E[U]￿
r = E[U]￿
m must
hold and the equilibrium has to satisfy,
1
2
[S (yb (n)(1 + ￿)) ￿ S (ya (n)(1 ￿ ￿))] ￿
￿
2
[W (n) ￿ W (1 ￿ n)] = ￿[V (1) ￿ V (1=2)]:
Using n = ￿ + ￿=2 and ￿ + ￿ = 1, we can express the equilibrium partition as a
function of n. The portion of intolerant individuals is given by,
￿
￿ = 2n ￿ 1;
and the fraction of tolerant individuals is,
￿
￿ = 2(1 ￿ n):
Notice that one necessarily has n > 1=2. Hence, in such an equilibrium, a permissive
education leads to both lower self-estem and lower expected social esteem than an au-
thoritarian one; but this is o⁄set by a larger expected income.




[S (ya (n)(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ S (yb (n)(1 + ￿))]+￿[V (1)￿V (1=2)]+
￿
2
[W (n) ￿ W (1 ￿ n)]:
(13)
26Each root of this equation that belongs to the interval (1=2;1) de￿nes an equilibrium
where ￿￿ > 0, ￿￿ > 0, and ￿
￿ = 0 if it also satis￿es E[U]￿
r ￿ E[U]￿
l. Again, multiple roots
are possible if ￿ is large.
Similar properties hold for polymorphic equilibria of the type ￿￿ > 0, ￿
￿ > 0, and
￿￿ = 0.
Appendix 2: Example of Pareto-Improving Tolerance
Consider the deterministic model of Section 3 under the following speci￿cation:





























Substituting the expressions for ya and yb into this equation and solving it, yields n￿ = 8=9.
Under tolerance, selfv(i) = 1=2 = socv(i), 8i. The equilibrium in the labor market is
then determined by
lnya = lnyb;
which yields nTol = 2=3.






































27Substituting these two equations in the above inequality shows that the latter is satis￿ed
if and only if ￿ < (4=3)ln(9=8):
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